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Some Sources for Hume's 
Account of Cause 
Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon 
The history of ideas encompasses many questions that extend beyond 
the interpretation fthe views of particular thinkers. 1 Among other things, 
they include questions about the relationship between the views and ideas 
of different times and questions about the intellectual milieu in which 
thinkers develop their perspectives. Hume addresses the former concerns 
in The Natural History of Religion and, in a more implicit way, the 
latter in a letter in which he tells his friend Michael Ramsay that the 
metaphysical parts of the Treatise will be understandable if one reads 
Malebranche's Recherche, Berkeley's Principles, Bayle's Dictionary, and 
Descartes's Meditations.2 
In the present paper, we address such questions as they relate to 
Hume's account of cause, discussing the extent to which his views are 
anticipated by ancient thinkers (in particular the ancient skeptics) and the 
extent to which available accounts of their views may have contributed 
to the development of Hume's own thinking. There is, we argue, a clearer 
anticipation of Hume in ancient thinking than usually imagined-one 
which probably contributes, in at least an indirect way, to Hume's thinking 
on the subject. 
We begin with an outline of Hume's general argument,3 leaving until 
'An earlier version of this paper was presented at a November 1990 workshop on 
"David Hume and His Background" at the University of Western Ontario. We are 
especially indebted to John Wright, Tom Lennon, William Harper, and David Fate Norton 
for their comments; to Brian Hillyard and Mike Barfoot for information on the holdings 
of Edinburgh libraries; and to Roger Emerson for information about Charles Mackie. Leo 
Groarke would like to thank the Calgary Institute for the Humanities for a fellowship 
supporting the work on the present paper. 
2 See Richard Popkin, "So, Hume did read Berkeley," Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1954) 
(the letter is dated 31 August, 1737). 
3A very detailed account of Hume's argument, like the one presented in J. L. Mackie's 
The Cement of the Universe (Oxford, 1974), esp. p.10, is unnecessary and problematic, 
requiring as it does a great deal of speculation about fine points of argument which are 
not addressed by Hume. In elaborating our account we refer to A Treatise of Human Nature 
(2nd ed.; Oxford, 1978) as Tr. and to the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. 
E. Steinberg (Indianapolis, 1977) as Enquiry. 
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646 Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon 
later differences that might be thought to separate Hume and earlier 
thinkers (viz., his appeal to the notion of power and his discussion of 
probability). For the moment, the important point is that the crux of 
Hume's critique of cause is his claim that the grounds of our belief in 
cause and effect-the constant conjunction of particular kinds of events- 
cannot, via reason, justify a belief in causes and effects (though Hume 
clearly thinks that there is a more practical sense in which such a belief 
is justified). 
We remember tohave had frequent instances of the existence of one species of 
objects; and also remember, that he individuals of another species of objects have 
always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and 
succession with regard to them. Thus we remember tohave seen that species of 
object we call flame, and to have felt hat species of sensation we call heat. We 
likewise call to mind their constant conjunction i  all past instances. Without 
any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the 
existence of the one from that of the other. (Tr, 87) 
Yet reason cannot justify the conclusion that there are causal laws. There 
is nothing contradictory about the supposition that nature will not proceed 
uniformly and we can easily imagine that particular causes are not fol- 
lowed by their regular effects. 
There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider these 
objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas which we form of them. 
Such an inference wou'd amount o knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute 
contradiction a d impossibility ofconceiving any thing different. But as all 
distinct ideas are separable, 'tis evident here can be no impossibility of that kind. 
(Tr, 86-87, cf. 139) 
Nor can probability establish "that instances, of which we have no 
experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and 
that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same" (Tr, 
88-89); for it is founded on the question-begging principle that there "is 
a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, 
and those, of which we have had none" (Tr, 90). 
It follows that we cannot justify our belief in cause: 
Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connection of 
cause and effects, but even after experience has inform'd us of their constant 
conjunction, 'tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we 
shou'd extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have 
fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there 
must be a resemblance b twixt those objects, of which we have had experience, 
and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. (Tr, 91-92) 
In the end, it is habit and custom, not reason, that are the bases of all our 
causal inferences. This does not mean, however, that we should give up 
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our belief in causes and effects. Rather, we need only recognize that it is the 
constant association of particular objects that makes the mind anticipate 
conjunctions of events and it is this psychological process, not any rational 
justification, that explains our faith in causal reasoning (cf. Tr, 167-69). 
Given the length of Hume's discussion there are, of course, many other 
aspects of his analysis (some of them controversial). For our purposes, it 
is enough to note the following four ideas that are central to it: 
1. the claim that the basis of our belief in cause and effect is the 
constant conjunction of the objects we designate cause and effect; 
2. the claim that we cannot demonstrate the necessity of causal rela- 
tionships because we can without contradiction imagine that causes are 
not always followed by their claimed effects; 
3. the claim that it begs the question to attempt o prove the probabil- 
ity of causal connections (for probability assumes that unobserved in- 
stances of particular events will be conjoined with the same events as 
observed ones); and 
4. the suggestion that we should, for practical reasons, accept a day 
to day belief in cause even though it cannot be justified by reason. 
It is these four ideas that we shall investigate in the works of earlier 
thinkers, arguing, in particular, that they are found in ancient skepticism. 
If one judges by the lack of references to earlier thinkers in most 
discussions of Hume's account of cause, one might expect few possible 
sources for Hume's thinking and, in consequence, many difficulties when 
one tries to prove an ancient source. In some ways the situation is the 
reverse. For though it is difficult to prove an ancient source of Hume's 
argument, this is in part because there are too many, not too few, possibilit- 
ies. It is also difficult to decide on the likelihood of a particular source of 
Hume's arguments just because the psychological processes that precipi- 
tate an argument are inherently indefinite and unpredictable. It is difficult 
to know how Hume might have interpreted particular ancient thinkers. 
In the case of Hume's critique of cause, we can illustrate the questions 
that this raises by turning first o Lucian and his relationship to Hume. 
It is difficult o establish the extent of Hume's acquaintance with 
Lucian's works before he wrote the Treatise, though we know that he 
studied under William Scot, Professor of Greek at Edinburgh, and that 
he thought very highly of Lucian's work later in his life. He refers to 
Lucian nine times in his moral, political, and literary essays, often in the 
most laudatory way. When he argues that ancient attitudes to women did 
not allow ancient writers to leave us "one piece of pleasantry that is 
excellent," Hume qualifies his judgment, noting that "one may except the 
Banquet of Xenophon, and the Dialogues of Lucian."4 In a letter to David 
4 "The Rise of Arts and Science," David Hume: Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, 
ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis, 1987), 134. 
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Hume the Younger, he recommends a course of summer reading that 
includes Lucian' and Abbe Morellet begins a letter to Hume with the 
remark that "As Lucian is your favourite author...."6 Finally, we note 
that it is Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead Hume turns to in preparing for 
death.7 
Given Hume's respect for Lucian, it is interesting to note that the 
latter's dialogue, "Zeus Rants" contains remarks which anticipate some 
of the central notions in Hume's critique of cause-notions that can in 
principle be derived from Epicurean thought. They occur in a passage in 
which the Epicurean Damis ("that sly rogue") rejects the Stoic Timocles' 
appeal to the argument from design as a basis for a belief in the providence 
of the gods. Timocles answers by explaining how he has come to believe 
that the gods exercise providence: 
In the first place the order of nature convinced me, the sun always going the 
same road and the moon likewise and the seasons changing and plants growing 
and living creatures being born, and these latter so cleverly devised that they can 
support life and move and think and walk and build houses and cobble shoes- 
and all the rest of it; these seem to me to be works of providence.8 
Damis replies that it begs the question to assume that the order we see in 
the world must be a reflection of divine providence. 
While I myself would say the recurrent phenomena are as you describe them, I 
need not, however, at once admit a conviction that they recur by some sort of 
providence. It's possible that they began at random and now take place with 
uniformity and regularity. But you call [this] necessity "order" and then, forsooth, 
get angry if anyone does not follow you when you catalogue and extol the 
characteristics of these phenomena and think it a proof that each of them is 
ordered by providence.9 
Though there seems no way to be sure that these comments influenced 
Hume, Damis clearly anticipates him when he suggests that events that 
occur with a regular and uniform pattern of behavior (i.e., events that are 
constantly conjoined) may have come about at random and may not be, 
therefore, necessarily conjoined. Regularity does not, in short, guarantee 
necessary connection. 
In making such claims, Damis invokes a standard tenet of Epicurean 
I Cited from David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, "New Light on the Hume 
Library," an unpublished paper presented to the Bibliographical Societies of Edinburgh 
and Oxford. 
6 John Young Thomson Grieg (ed.), Letters of David Hume (2 vols.; Oxford, 1932), 
II, 158, n. 1. 
I See Ernest C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1980), 600-601. 
8 "Zeus Rants," The Works of Lucian, tr. A. M. Harmon (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 
II, 38. 
9Ibid., 39. 
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theory, maintaining that the present order of things one finds in the 
world is not necessary (though it is regular) and is the result of chance 
interactions of the atoms (cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 1.1024-35; 
Hume's discussion of such possibilities in the Dialogues Concerning Natu- 
ral Religion, Part 8; and the seventeenth-century discussion of Epicurean- 
ism in Thomas Stanley's History of Philosophy).10 More generally, the 
Epicureans claim that it is the random (in the sense of unpredictable and 
undetermined) swerve of atoms that produces the world we know. Such 
views obviously raise questions about the extent to which our belief in 
cause and effect reflects necessary connections in the world and may in 
this way provoke the critique of necessary connection that one finds in 
Hume. The Epicurean principles defended in Lucian show that we can 
imagine (as the Epicureans do) that the present order of nature is not 
necessary. Hume himself scathingly rejects Epicurean principles,11 but 
this itself shows that he knew and considered them. Ultimately, he must 
find the Epicurean claim that the present order of events is not necessary 
too radical, preferring the weaker claim that it cannot be known to be 
necessary (and perhaps accepting a belief in necessary connection onethe- 
less). 12 But this does not mean that Epicurean ideas did not motivate (or 
at least contribute) to the account of cause that Hume propounds. 
Another possible antecedent of Hume's critique of cause is, as Ken 
Dorter has suggested, 13the myth of the cave in Plato's Republic (Bk. VII, 
5156). Here it is suggested that the cave's prisoners are mistaken when 
they interpret he shadows on the wall in front of them as the cause of 
sounds they hear. Their interpretation of events in this way is the result 
of the conjunction of the shadows and the sounds and this implies that 
an observed conjunction of events provides no proof of a cause and effect 
relationship-a principle that plays a central role in Hume's reasoning. 
It might be thought that this reading of the myth of the cave is an 
unnatural one which is possible only because we are already familiar with 
Hume's account of cause. One should note, however, that Plato's doubts 
about our ordinary view of cause and effect are a clear and obvious 
consequence of his rejection of the reality of the ordinary world in favor 
of a world of forms. This being said, it must be granted that it seems 
unlikely that Plato played a substantive role in the development of Hume's 
10 See Thomas Stanley, A History of Philosophy, 1687 (New York, 1978), 874 (Ch. II) 
& 875 (Ch. V). 
11 In Part VIII of Hume's Dialogues, Philo asks "what if I should revive the old 
Epicurean hypothesis?" It is, he remarks, "commonly, and I believe, justly, esteemed the 
most absurd system, that has yet been proposed." However, "with a few alterations, it 
might ... be brought o bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter 
infinite, as Epicureans did, let us suppose it finite...." 
12 For a recent account see Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, 
and David Hume (Oxford, 1989). 
13 Personal communication. 
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thinking. His letters contain scattered references to Plato and he refers to 
the Republic twice in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and 
twice in his moral, political, and literary essays, but he takes a very dim 
view of Plato's outlook, comparing "the visionary systems or ravings of 
Plato" to "the solid sense of Plutarch." 14 
Though they anticipate some elements of Hume's account of cause, 
the anticipations of Hume we find in Lucian and Plato do not encompass 
detailed analogues of the four points we noted in our account of his 
discussion. In contrast, the analogue of Hume one finds in ancient skepti- 
cism provides a much more detailed anticipation of Hume's reasoning. It 
is in this regard worth noting that Epicurean and Platonic principles must 
contribute to the intellectual milieu that produced this aspect of ancient 
skepticism. Plato's myth of the cave is particularly significant given that 
it anticipates later skepticism, which might be summarized as the claim 
that we cannot know that the world really is as it appears (that we may, 
for all we know, be in the position of the prisoners in Plato's cave). Unlike 
Plato, however, the skeptics deny that we can find our way out of the 
cave and establish the true nature of the world, maintaining that we can 
only say how things appear relative to our subjective circumstances (the 
mode of relativity is, according to Sextus, the basic Pyrrhonean mode- 
PH, 1.29). 
The skeptics' view of cause and effect is discussed in detail in the 
extant works of Sextus Empiricus, which provide our most complete 
account of ancient skepticism (Sextus himself is a Pyrrhonean, but his 
arguments and discussion are also influenced by academic skepticism). In 
the present context they are especially relevant, for they were readily 
available to Hume. According to A. P. Cavendish, his "knowledge of 
Greek was inadequate for the purpose" of reading Sextus, but "the edition 
of J. A. Fabricius (Leipzig, 1718) included the Latin version of H. Ste- 
phens, which Hume was probably capable of reading." Cavendish none- 
theless rejects any significant influence, remarking that "The only refer- 
ence to Sextus in Hume's philosophical writings occurs at Essay on the 
Natural History of Religion, IV (1757). There can be no question of 
plagiarism. Hume's analysis is far more subtle and thorough than anything 
attempted by Sextus."'5 
In answer to Cavendish's remarks, it should be said that Hume's 
analysis is a variant of Sextus's, that there is a second reference to him in 
Section XII of The Natural History of Religion, and that there is a third 
reference in Hume's essay "On the Populousness of Ancient Nations" 16 
a reference which refers to one of the books of Sextus (the Outlines of 
14 "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," Essays, 377-464. 
15 A. P. Cavendish, David Hume (New York, 1968), 175. 
16 Essays, 399. 
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Pyrrhonism, Book 3) that contains an analogue of Hume's critique of 
cause. More importantly, Cavendish overlooks the much more accessible 
version of Sextus available to Hume in the translation of the Outlines 
contained in Thomas Stanley's History of Philosophy. Stanley (1625-78) 
was known principally as a poet but turned to classical scholarship in 
1651. The first volume of his History of Philosophy was published in 1655, 
and other volumes followed in 1656, 1660, and 1662. In 1661 he was 
elected a Charter Member of the Royal Society. Charles Mackie used 
the History as a sourcebook for undergraduates during Hume's time at 
Edinburgh, and both the University library and the library of the Advo- 
cates (which functioned as a library for polite Edinburgh) contained Stan- 
ley's work. 17 
Jonathan Barnes has claimed that Sextus does not anticipate Hume, 
but this is because Barnes has not considered all the relevant texts and 
because there are problems with his analysis of some of those he does 
discuss (see below)."8 The most natural place to look for an analogue of 
Hume is in Sextus's presentation of Aenesidemus's eight tropes against 
the dogmatists' accounts of cause (their "aetiologies"). They encompass a 
variety of considerations that are not directly relevant o Hume's concerns, 
though modes one and four can be interpreted in a way that makes them 
analogues of Hume's reasoning. 
The First [mode holds that Aetiology cannot be established], for ... the kind of 
Aetiology, which is conversant inthings not apparent, hath not an acknowledged 
proof rom apparent hings.... 
The Fourth, for ... taking Phaenomena's a they are, they think they comprehend 
things not apparent, as they are likewise; for things not apparent are perhaps 
effected the same way as Phaenomenas, perhaps ome other peculiar way.19 
The crux of these modes is the Pyrrhonean distinction between those 
things which appear (appearances or phainomena) and those things which 
actually exist. Modes one and four are thus founded on the claim that 
aetiologists attempt o establish what are, in reality, causes and effects on 
the basis of what appears to be the case. What appears to be the case (and 
what appear to be causes and effects) may, however, be distinct from what 
is actually the case (from what are actual causes and effects) and it follows 
that one cannot use the former as a basis for conclusions about the latter. 
According to Barnes,20 there is no reason to accept the skeptic's point 
17 Both libraries had the 1687 second edition; the University library had the first edition 
as well. In discussing Sextus's anticipation of Hume, we rely on Stanley's translation, 
which remains very readable today. 
18 Jonathan Barnes, "Ancient Skepticism and Causation," Myles Burnyeat (ed.), The 
Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley, 1983). 
19 Stanley, 787; Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.17.181-82 (in references to the Outlines 
outside Stanley, we list book, chapter and line numbers). 
20 The Skeptical Tradition, 164-66. 
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without a reason for believing that appearances and the nonapparent are 
distinct, but from the skeptic's tandpoint his is a case of misplaced onus. 
It is the dogmatists who claim to know causes and their claims can be 
justified only if they can justify the assumptions they depend on. 
For our purposes the important point is that those things which appear 
to be causes and effects are those things which are constantly conjoined 
in our experience, and that modes one and four thus suggest that we 
cannot justify the dogmatists' assumption that things which are constantly 
conjoined are in reality causes and effects (i.e., necessarily conjoined). 
Reading Sextus in this way, the modes against the aetiologists do contain 
an analogue of Hume's critique of cause. Indeed, such an interpretation 
suggests that Sextus anticipates the positive and the negative side of 
Hume's account, for his rejection of the dogmatists' claims is coupled 
with a commitment to "acquiese in Phaenomena [i.e., appearances]" and 
use them as a criteria which determines "in the course of life what things 
are to be done, what not."'21 In the realm of causes and effects this 
obviously implies an acceptance of apparent causes and effects. On the 
proposed reading, however, this implies an acceptance of the apparent tie 
between objects and events which are constantly conjoined-an accept- 
ance which is an analogue of Hume's acceptance of causes and effects in 
day to day affairs. 
That this is the correct interpretation of modes one and four of the 
Pyrrhoneans' tropes against cause is suggested by Sextus's remarks in 
Book Two of the Outlines, which contain a more explicit version of such 
reasoning in the Pyrrhonean critique of signs-a critique which shows 
that Sextus considers apparent causes and effects to be objects which are 
constantly conjoined. The principle problem with Barnes's account is his 
failure to note that Sextus treats causes and effects as signs of one another, 
a failure which allows him to overlook the critique of cause which is 
implied by Sextus's account of signs. The basis of this account is an 
account of (following Stanley) "hypomnestick" (or "admonitive") and 
"endictick" (or "indicative") signs. 
A Hypomnestick sign, they call that which being observed to be together with a 
significate, evident, as soon as ever the sign evidently incurreth to our sense, 
tho' the significate appear not, yet it causeth us to remember that which was 
concomitant toit, tho' at present not evident, as smoke and fire.22 
A hypomnestick or (following Bury)23 "suggestive" sign (literally, a sign 
which reminds us) is, in other words, one which we have observed together 
with its significate (what it is a sign of) to such an extent hat its appearance 
21 Stanley, 777; Outlines, 1.11.21. 
22 Stanley, 800; Outlines, 2.10.100. 
23 Sextus Empiricus, tr. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, 1933-49). 
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immediately reminds us of the significate. The constant association of 
smoke and fire leads us, for example, to take smoke as a hypomnestick 
sign, in this case an effect, of fire. Sextus applies the same account "to the 
scar which follows the wound, and to the puncture of the heart that 
precedes death; for on seeing the scar we recall the wound that preceded 
it, and on viewing the puncture of the heart we foretell the immanence of 
death" (AM, 8.151-53). From Hume's point of view, those things we 
ordinarily call causes and effects are suggestive (i.e., hypomnestick) signs, 
for their constant conjunction makes us associate them with each other 
and it is this-not a necessary connection-which explains why we treat 
them as causes and effects. 
The positive side of Hume's account of cause is his suggestion that 
we should believe in causes and effects even though we cannot build a 
philosophical foundation for the claims that this implies. He himself 
contrasts uch an outlook with the tenets of Pyrrhonism, remarking that 
"All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in 
total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their 
miserable existence" if Pyrrhonism were to "universally and steadily" 
prevail (Enquiry, 128). In fact, the Pyrrhoneans adopt a position which 
is strictly analogous to Hume's, explicitly restricting their critique of 
signs to endictick signs, suggesting that we rely on hypomnestick signs in 
everyday life. As Sextus writes: 
Of these two kinds of signs [the hypomnestick and the endictick], we oppose not 
both, but onely the Endictick, as seeming to be forged by the Dogmatists; the 
Hypomnestick [the suggestive] is creditable in the course of life; for whosoever 
sees smoke, knows that Fire is signified, and seeing a scar saith, it had been a 
wound. So as we not onely not contradict the common course of life, but maintain 
it, assenting inopinionatively [i.e., undogmatically] to that in it which is creditable, 
but opposing what is particularly forged by the Dogmatists.24 
In keeping with his general claim that the Pyrrhoneans accept appearances 
(and only reject claims about the world beyond them), Sextus thus suggests 
that the Pyrrhoneans accept things which are constantly conjoined as 
apparent signs and apparent causes and effects, anticipating Hume's ac- 
ceptance of them in day to day affairs.25 
The negative side of Hume's critique of cause which we found in the 
modes against aetiology finds an analogue in the Pyrrhonean rejection of 
endictick signs. Stanley's translation of this aspect of Sextus is sometimes 
problematic, but it still provides a basis for Hume's critique. In introduc- 
24 Stanley, 800; Outlines, 2.10.102. 
25 One might distinguish between the kinds of belief in cause and effect that are 
proposed by Hume and the Pyrrhoneans by delving into the details of the Pyrrhoneans 
"undogmatic" belief, but such matters are beyond the scope of the present paper; for an 
account of Pyrrhonean belief, see Leo Groarke, Greek Scepticism: Anti-Realist Trends in 
Ancient Thought (Kingston, Montreal, 1990), esp. 136-40 and 144-46. 
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ing the Pyrrhonean critique of signs, it notes (following the first remarks 
on hypomnestick signs quoted above) that: 
An Endictick sign, (say they) is that which is not observed together with an 
evident significate, but of its own nature and constitution signifieth at whereof 
it is a signe; thus the motions of the body are signes of the soul. 
Hereupon they define [endictick] Signe thus, Signe is a demonstrative 
axiome, antecedent in a sound connex, detective of that which followeth.6 
This last sentence needs to be explained. A definition of the terms that 
it contains, found on the same page in Stanley, implies that a sign is some 
provable thing (axiom) which is the antecedent of a true conditional (a 
sound connex) and thus establishes the existence of the thing referred to 
in the conditional's consequent. A woman's having milk is, for example, 
alleged to be a sign of her having conceived, for it is alleged to be the 
antecedent of the true conditional, "If she has milk, she has conceived." 
The claim that an endictick sign indicates its significate in "its own 
nature and constitution" amounts to the claim that the sign always and 
necessarily indicates its significate. The claim that such a sign must render 
true the antecedent of a true conditional that has its significate as a 
consequence implies a necessary connection. In the case of signs that are 
causes and effects, this means that endictick causes and effects must be 
necessarily conjoined, and that the Pyrrhonean rejection of endictick signs 
implies the rejection of necessary connection. 
Sextus's suggestion that an endictick sign "is not observed together 
with an evident significate"27 may seem problematic, for this might, on 
first reading, be taken to imply that causes and effects are not treated as 
endictick signs (for they are observed together with their evident signifi- 
cates).28 Such a reading would destroy the symmetry between hypomnes- 
tick and endictick signs, however, and any such exclusion is contradicted 
by the suggestion that an endictick sign is one that makes the antecedent 
of a true conditional true, for this obviously can be so in the case of causes 
and effects. Indeed, Sextus himself gives "she hath milk" as an alleged 
example of an endictick sign of "she hath conceived" because they are 
said to be joined by the true conditional, "If she hath milk, she hath 
conceived." The suggestion that an endictick sign is not observed with an 
evident significate can, therefore, be best understood as the claim that it 
is not understood as a sign merely because it is constantly associated with 
its significate (because it is psychologically associated, as in the case of 
hypomnestick signs), but because it is in some stronger sense tied to its 
significate. 
26 Sextus in Stanley, 800; Outlines, 2. 1 0. 101. 
27 Cf. Bury: "is not clearly associated with...." 
28 His example (of bodily motions as signs of the soul) might be taken as a case where 
signs are not observed with their significates, for mental states are not directly observable. 
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In the very act of rejecting endictick signs in favor of hypomnestick 
signs, Sextus's critique anticipates Hume's claim that our belief in causes 
and effects must be founded on observed conjunctions of events which 
cannot establish their necessary connection. The Pyrrhonean suggestion 
that we should accept (and rely on) hypomnestick signs anticipates 
Hume's suggestion that we accept our day to day belief in cause without 
a philosophical foundation. It might, however, still be asked whether the 
Pyrrhoneans give the same grounds for rejecting the claim that constant 
conjunction implies necessary connection-i.e., the untenability of a de- 
fense of this implication in terms of logical necessity or probability (points 
2 and 3 in our summary of Hume's reasoning). Leaving till later Hume's 
claims about the impossibility of defending this inference on the basis of 
probability, we may note that the Pyrrhoneans provide a clear analogue 
of Hume's suggestion that causal necessity cannot be reduced to logical 
necessity. 
This aspect of Sextus's critique of endictick signs depends on the 
notion of a "relative," a concept the Pyrrhoneans use to refer to things 
which cannot be separately conceived. Among the examples Sextus uses 
to illustrate his various discussions of relatives are the concepts whiter 
and blacker, sweet and bitter, left and right, and whole and part (see AM, 
8.154, 161-62, 9.340). In general it may be said that X and Y are relatives 
if and only if any claim about X logically entails a claim about Y (if 
something is sweet it is not bitter, if it is a whole, its parts are subsumed 
by it, and so on). Signs which are necessarily tied to their significates 
(endictick signs) must be relative to their significates, for it must be 
impossible to imagine such signs occurring without their significates. It 
is only this that allows one to deduce the existence of the latter from the 
former (cf. AM, 9.340). The problem is that this implies that such signs 
and their significates are not logically distinct and cannot, therefore, 
function as signs and significates. 
... if it [the sign] be relative to the significate, it must necessarily be compre- 
hended together with the significate, as right with left, upwards with downwards 
and the like: But if it be detective of the significate, it is necessary that it be 
comprehended before it, that, being first known, it may bring to us the notion of 
the thing which is known by it.... Therefore itis impossible to understand any 
thing which is not only relative to, but detective also of, that o which it is relative: 
But a [endictick] sign, say they, is both relative to, and detective of the significate, 
therefore it is impossible to understand the sign.29 
It is important o see that the temporal considerations this argument 
invokes are not essential to it. Thus the crux of the Pyrrhoneans' reasoning 
is the claim that signs and significates (e.g., smoke and fire) must be 
distinct entities and that this cannot be the case if they are necessarily 
29 Stanley, 801; Outlines, 2.11.119-20. 
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(i.e., logically) conjoined. The latter implies that they cannot be temporally 
distinct, but this is a consequence of the more basic point that they cannot 
be separately conceived. As Sextus notes, "the sign is relative to the 
significate, and relatives are comprehended together with one another," 
and an endictick sign cannot, therefore, be apparent without its significate 
and is useless as a sign. "For as right and left incurring to us together, 
right is not said to be more apparent than left, or left than right; in like 
manner the sign and the significate being comprehended together, it can- 
not be said that the sign is more apparent than the significate: But if the 
significate be apparent, it is not a significate, as not needing any to signifie 
and detect it."30 
Applying this reasoning to endictick signs which are said to be causes 
and effects of one another, it can be said that they must be relatives and 
thus logically inseparable. But this implies that they are not logically 
distinct objects and not, therefore, genuine causes and effects. As Hume 
puts it at one point, "There is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, 
which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it" (Tr, 
139). 
Hume's argument against cause employs the same logical considera- 
tions, though it goes the other way around, assuming that causes and 
effects are distinct and concluding that they are not necessarily conjoined. 
As he puts it, "There is no object, which implies the existence of any other 
[distinct object] if we consider these objects in themselves, and never look 
beyond the ideas which we form of them. Such an inference wou'd amount 
to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and impossibil- 
ity of conceiving any thing different. But as all distinct ideas are separable, 
'tis evident there can be no impossibility of that kind" (Tr, 87). 
Sextus explicitly applies the temporal version of such reasoning to 
causes and effects in Book III of the Outlines, in a section one of the first 
reviewers of the Treatise suggests as similar to Hume's argument against 
cause.31 According to the relevant part of Sextus's discussion (a part which 
Barnes does not discuss), there is no way to establish that there are any 
causes, for causes must precede their effects and this is impossible given 
that causes and effects are supposed to be relatives, i.e., necessarily con- 
joined and thus logically inseparable. 
... a Cause ... must first exist, and be a Cause, and then produce the Effect, 
which is said to be the Effect hereof, The Cause already existing. But Cause 
30 Ibid. 
31 In the Bibliotheque raisonee for April-May-June 1740. The reviewer notes that 
Hume's discussion of cause "is pretty close to the manner in which Sextus Empiricus 
formerly reasoned in his Hypotyposes, Book III, Chap. III." This remark is noted in 
Mossner, The Life of David Hume, 129. A. P. Cavendish was puzzled by the section of 
Sextus referred to, but we will argue that it contains an analogue of Hume's critique. 
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being relative to the Effect, it is manifest that, as Cause, it cannot exist before 
it.32 (Cf. AM, 2.168, 9.234-36) 
If we want to put the same argument in words that are closer to Hume's, 
we might begin with his already quoted claim that "There is nothing in 
any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing 
a conclusion beyond it" (Tr, 139). This suggests that we can establish the 
existence of an effect from the existence of a cause only if its effect is not 
logically distinct. But then the one cannot occur before the other, as is 
required by the concept of a cause and its effect. Here again, the important 
point is that distinct causes and effects can be conceived without each 
other and need not, therefore, be necessarily conjoined. 
Of the four aspects of Hume's account of cause we noted at the outset, 
the only one we have not yet found in Sextus is the suggestion that a belief 
in cause and effect cannot be defended by an appeal to probability. Given 
no clear distinction between objective and subjective probability (Car- 
neades' pithanon is better understood as a notion of plausibility),33 the 
Pyrrhoneans do not discuss it in a direct way, but their critique of induc- 
tive inference ncompasses the crux of Hume's analysis in this regard. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which it is more comprehensive than Hume's 
reasoning, for it rejects all inductive inferences (and is not restricted to 
an attack on causal claims), questioning the assumption that the regulari- 
ties we have observed in nature will continue in the future. As Sextus puts 
it, an induction cannot be known to be correct as long as we have not 
observed all instances of the phenomena in question, "it being possible, 
that some of the omitted Particulars may be found contrary to the Univer- 
sal Proposition"34 (cf. Hume's complaint that probability "is founded on 
the presumption of a resemblance betwixt hose objects, of which we have 
had experience, and those, of which we have had none," Tr, 90). As Sextus 
notes elsewhere, such reasoning shows that generalizations like "Every 
man is a living creature" and "No man is four footed" cannot be justified.35 
Exactly the same reasoning is applicable to causal inductions (for they 
are also based on the question-begging assumption that future observa- 
tions will confirm past ones) and it would, therefore, be a mistake to think 
32 Stanley, 815; Outlines, 3.5.26-28. Cf. the remarks that "Relatives, as Relatives, 
coexist, and are understood together; but ... it is necessary, that a Cause first be a Cause 
before it produce the Effect" (ibid.) and that "if we cannot understand a Cause (forasmuch 
as it is relative,) before its Effect; and, to understand it as Cause of the Effect, it be 
necessary to understand it, as being before the Effect ... then it is impossible to understand 
that there is Cause" (ibid.). 
33 It is a measure of the force of the impression we experience and not as clearly tied 
to the enumeration of particular cases as the notion of probability Hume adopts. On this 
point, see Myles Burnyeat, "Carneades Was No Probabilist," forthcoming. 
34 Stanley, 807; Outlines, 2.15.204. 
35 Ibid. 
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that Sextus's discussion contains no antecedent of Hume's arguments 
against the probability of inductive inferences. 
It should by now be clear that Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism contains 
an extensive analogue of Hume's critique of cause. The question whether 
this analogue influenced Hume remains. In favor of direct influence, one 
might note that Stanley's translation made Sextus very readily accessible 
and that it would at least be odd to find that someone preoccupied with 
skepticism as a problem would not consult the most accessible text that 
represents the views of real skeptics. In answer to such suggestions, one 
might point to modern and contemporary epistemology, which is equally 
caught up with the problem of skepticism, but for the most part ignores 
the details of the ancient skeptics' views (even when it makes reference 
to the ancient schools).36 Given such considerations and Hume's own 
caricature of the Pyrrhonean position,37 it seems unlikely that Hume 
was familiar with the details of Sextus's Outlines when he composed the 
Treatise. 
In contrast, it is much more difficult o dismiss the possibility of 
indirect influence on Hume's thinking. Given Stanley's translation, the 
appropriate sections of Sextus were available, not just to Hume, but to all 
of his contemporaries. Most notably perhaps, Hume's teachers did know 
Stanley. That the relevant sections of Sextus were disseminated to at least 
some extent is shown by the reference to Sextus in the review of the 
Treatise cited above (assuming Hume saw the review, it is difficult o 
believe that he would not have looked it up). 
Given that we can never know what passed in conversation between 
Hume, his fellow students, his professors and acquaintances, an exact 
account of the development of his ideas on cause seems impossible, though 
it seems certain that ancient philosophy provided a context for much of 
this discussion. Indeed, Hume's reading of Bayle establishes this in a very 
general way. Sextus's anticipation of Hume's arguments against cause and 
the more general anticipations one finds in Lucian and even Plato (and 
in Sextus's very general tropes, from which one can derive the critique of 
cause), are not, therefore, compatible with the usual assumption that 
ancient discussion had no effect on Hume's thoughts about the problems 
of causes and effects. To reinforce this conclusion, we finish our discussion 
with an account of other thinkers who influenced Hume's account of 
cause. 
Given the possibility that Sextus influenced Hume's account of cause, 
36 See Groarke, Greek Scepticism. 
3 On this point, cf. David Fate Norton's remark that "It is difficult to reconcile . . . 
Pyrrhonism with Hume's views on the topic" (David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, 
Sceptical Metaphysician [Princeton, 1982], 266). 
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it is natural to ask how such influence fits with other accounts of the 
genesis of Hume's ideas in this regard. Malebranche is the most important 
figure in this regard, for Charles McCracken has shown that "There can 
be no question that Hume, when composing the account of causality in 
the Treatise, had Malebranche's treatment of that topic in his thoughts."38 
Indeed, the parallel passages McCracken notes convincingly establish that 
"Hume not only kept the Search [The Search for Truth] in mind as he 
wrote on causality, but that he even had it open for consultation while 
writing."39 
Two things should be said about the implications of such considera- 
tions in the present context. Firstly, and most obviously, it must be said 
that a variety of influences probably manifest hemselves in Hume's views, 
and that Malebranche's influence does not, therefore, xclude the possibil- 
ity of other influences. Secondly, it should be noted that Malebranche 
himself is to some extent a vehicle for ancient skeptical doubts, and his 
influence on Hume thus supports rather than diminishes the probability 
of the general claim that Hume's views are tied to ancient skepticism. 
Ancient doubts about causation were available to Malebranche in 
the same way they were available to Hume-via Stanley's translation of 
Sextus-but his preoccupation with occasionalism (the doctrine that God 
is the only efficient cause) suggests a more circuitous route from ancient 
skepticism. To understand this route, we must first turn to medieval 
anticipations of Hume's views. 
Though there is no reason to think that the arguments they employ 
are exclusively theirs, two figures mentioned as medieval precursors of 
Hume on cause are the fourteenth-century French philosopher, Nicholas 
of Autrecourt (dubbed "the medieval Hume)"40 and the eleventh-century 
Islamic thinker, al-Ghazali. For our purposes, the apparent lack of any 
plausible link between Nicholas and Hume makes Nicholas interesting 
only because his views may be yet another manifestation of ancient skepti- 
cal concerns.41 
38 Charles J. McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford, 1983), 257. 
39 Ibid., 258. 
40 Cf. the introduction to the selections from Nicholas in A. Hyman and J. J. Walsh 
(eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis, 1973), 654. 
41 In Nicholas of Autrecourt (Princeton, 1948), Julius Weinberg questions Nicholas's 
knowledge of earlier skeptics, but there are many references that suggest that he was 
familiar with their work. At one point, he refers to the academic skeptics, suggesting 
that Bernard's position entails "the absurdities of the Academics." His familiarity with 
Pyrrhonean skepticism seems reflected in his use of Rome as an example of what is not 
immediately evident (cf. his Universal Treatise 228 and PH 2.98; AM 8.145); in his extended 
discussion of the standard Pyrrhonean antithesis between the tastes of things which appear 
sweet to the healthy and bitter to the sick (ibid., 228 and passim.); in his appeal to 
appearances as a basis for belief; and in the general structure of his basic arguments for 
skepticism. Above and beyond this circumstantial evidence, there may be an explicit 
reference to the Pyrrhoneans in Nicholas's second letter to Bernard, where he argues that 
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Ghazali's views are more important because they have been linked to 
Malebranche's occasionalism. His critique of cause is included in The 
Incoherence of the Philosophers (the Tahafut al Falasifa), which attacks 
Aristotle and his Islamic followers on twenty points which contradict he 
tenets of orthodox Islam. He finds a belief in strict natural necessity 
unacceptable because it makes God an amorphous first cause, remote 
from day to day reality and unable to intervene in the natural order of 
events. In order to reestablish God's omnipotence and the possibility of 
miracles, Ghazali defends occasionalism, the view that God is the immedi- 
ate cause of all events. Unlike Sextus, Ghazali therefore introduces the 
notion of God into his analysis. Theological considerations thus motivate 
his arguments though they do not play a crucial role in logically establish- 
ing his conclusions (the notion that God is the basic efficient cause is 
already found in Anaxagoras and in Stoicism, and is mentioned in Sextus 
at AM, 9.6; elsewhere Sextus remarks that the majority have declared that 
God is a most efficient Cause and therefore begins an account of efficient 
principles "by inquiring about God .. ."-PH, 3.2).42 
In defending his occasionalism, Ghazali rejects natural necessity, hold- 
ing that our belief that objects and events are causes and effects is based 
on God's decision to ". . . create them in a successive order, though not 
because this connection is necessary in itself and cannot be disjoined. On 
the contrary, it is in God's power to create satiety without eating and 
decapitation without death, and so on with respect to all connections."43 
Like Hume, Nicholas, and the Pyrrhoneans, Ghazali bases his critique of 
the external world is not known intuitively, for if it were, "rustics" (rustici) would know 
that it exists. Weinberg (39) takes this literally, as a reference to peasants, but they do not, 
in any straightforward way, deny the existence of the external world. Rather than peasants, 
it seems that it is Pyrrhoneans that Nicholas has in mind, using a Latin equivalent of a 
term we find in Galen, when he calls the more radical skeptics "rustic Pyrrhoneans" 
(agroikopyrroneious, 8.711.1-3). Obviously, they clearly deny our knowledge of external 
objects and Nicholas can, therefore, legitimately invoke them to show that it cannot be 
assumed. 
42 According to Weinberg, Nicholas of Autrecourt's critique of cause is more radical 
than any propounded by predecessors like Ghazali because it is less dependent on God's 
ability to intervene in the natural order of events. It is, however, hard to see why this 
would make it stronger (unless one assumes, in an ad hoc way, that one can disprove the 
existence of God) and the claim that God can perform miracles does not play a crucial 
role in Pyrrhonean arguments or in al-Ghazali. In the latter case it is a conclusion, not a 
premise, in Ghazali's reasoning. Ghazali is motivated by religious commitments, but this 
is another matter and Nicholas invokes a similar appeal when (in his fifth letter) he 
suggests that God may be the only efficient cause. Unlike Ghazali, he does not personally 
endorse such a view (ibid., 259), but still holds that it is a possibility which cannot be 
disproven, and which entails that natural causes may not exist (or may even be impossible). 
43 Tahafut al Falasifa, in Averroes's Tahafut al Tahafut ("The Incoherence of the 
Incoherence," a response to Ghazali which includes his entire text), Simon Van Den 
Bergh, ed. and tr. (2 vols.; London, 1954), I, 517. 
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cause on the claim that the distinctness of cause and effect shows that it 
is not contradictory to deny causal necessity. 
According to us, the connection between what is usually believed to be a cause 
and what is believed to be an effect isnot a necessary connection; each of two 
things has its own individuality and is not the other, and neither the affirmation 
nor the negation, either the existence nor the non-existence of the one is logically 
implied in the affirmation, egation, existence and non-existence of the 
other...."4 
According to Ghazali, our observations of causes and effects and the 
habits they produce only establish their past conjunction, and not a neces- 
sary connection. In attempting to prove that contact with fire causes a 
piece of cotton to burn, for example, "the philosophers have no other 
proof than the observation of the occurrence of the burning, when there 
is contact with fire, but observation proves only a simultaneity, not a 
causation, and, in reality, there is no other cause but God."45 This does 
not mean that we should give up reliance on causes and effects in ordinary 
affairs but only that we cannot justify it and that we should instead accept 
the regularity of God's actions. 
Ghazali is important in the present context because he influenced 
Malebranche, who adopted a similar occasionalism which seems to have 
exerted a great influence on Hume's thinking. According to Naify, Hume 
"simply took over Malebranche's criticism of the traditional theories [of 
cause], and then turned a part of Malebranche's critical apparatus against 
him," arguing that God's role as cause is similarly unprovable.46 Naify's 
suggestion that Malebranche is indebted to Ghazali is confirmed by Len- 
non, who notes that Malebranche gives Suarez's discussion of the views 
of Averroes (and, implicitly, Ghazali) as the source of his occasionalist 
concerns.47 
In light of our concerns, the important point is that Hume's ties, via 
Malebranche and Suarez, to Ghazali bind him once again to ancient 
skepticism, for it exerted a great influence on Ghazali and the Islamic 
tradition of which he is a part.48 Van Den Bergh's discussion of the debate 
between Ghazali and Averroes thus contains forty-four references to Sex- 
tus Empiricus, and Ghazali's discussion repeatedly employs the kinds 
of example one finds in ancient skeptical discussions of causation-in 
particular, burning, the possibility of an individual changing into another 
species, and the different effects the sun and fire have on different things 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 518, cf. 537. 
46 James Frederick Naify, Arabic and European Occasionalism (Ph.D. diss., San Diego, 
1975), 181. 
47 Thomas Lennnon, " Veritas Filia Temporis: Hume on Time and Causation," History 
of Philosophy Quarterly, 2 (1985), 287. 
48 See Van Den Bergh's extensive notes. 
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(see AM, 9.202-3, 241, 247-49; PH, 3.18; cf. AM, 8.192-94, D.L. 9.104). 
Medical examples like those that Ghazali uses were probably a standard 
part of the repertoire of the ancient empirical school of medicine, which 
has ties to Pyrrhonism and denies the possibility of establishing causes 
and effects. Such ties are confirmed by Maimonides' remark that "One 
must know everything the moslems, Mu'tazilites as well as Ash'arites [the 
latter sect being al-Ghazali's], have professed concerning these subjects, 
has been borrowed from the Greeks and Syrians who applied themselves 
to the criticism of the philosophers [i.e., the skeptics]."49 It is difficult 
(perhaps impossible) to determine the exact way in which ancient skeptical 
discussions of cause influence Ghazali, but it can safely be said that some 
such influence constitutes one way in which the Pyrrhonean critique of 
cause did indirectly influence Hume, in this case via Malebranche. 
Rather than show that Sextus did not influence Hume, then, the 
hypothesis that his account of cause is ultimately derived from al-Gha- 
zali's occasionalism supports an indirect connection. Yet another possibil- 
ity is indirect influence through some of Hume's contemporaries who 
were familiar with Sextus in the Greek or Latin, or through Thomas 
Stanley's History. Joseph Glanvill is a case in point, though Popkin has 
argued that his influence on Hume's account of cause is minimal.50 Some 
such possibility may be indicated by Hume's use of the notion of a "rela- 
tive" when he discusses the possibility of justifying a belief in power as a 
basis for a belief in cause, remarking that "the idea of power is relative as 
much as that of cause; and both have a reference to an effect, or some other 
event constantly conjoined with the former.""5 A detailed examination of 
all the possibilities of indirect influence are, however, beyond the scope 
of the present paper. 
We have been concerned to make the following main points: (1) An- 
49Guide of the Perplexed, 1.71, Van den Bergh, II, 1. 
50 H. G. Van Leeuwen remarks that "Ferris Greenslet, in his Joseph Glanvill: A Study 
in English Thought and Letters of the Seventeenth Century (New York, 1900), points out 
that Glanvill's account of the causes of human ignorance is derived in large measure from 
Sextus Empiricus. Glanvill may have had direct access to a copy of Sextus's writings, or 
may have used Thomas Stanley's The History of Philosophy (London, 1655), which contains 
large extracts from the skeptic's writings" (H. H. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty 
in English Thought, 1630-1690 [2nd ed.; The Hague, 1970] 79). Richard Popkin discusses 
Glanvill's skepticism about causation and his influence on Hume in "Joseph Glanvill: A 
Precursor to David Hume," JHI, 14 (1953), 292-303. Popkin remarks that Glanvill 
"indicates ... that the Humean theory of causality is latent in the Pyrrhonean point of 
view." 
51 Enquiry VII ii 77n. Cf. ft. 32, above. And we note, contra Barnes, that Hume's 
reference to "power" does not clearly distinguish him from the ancient skeptics (see 
Barnes, 178). Hume believed cause is the crucial notion and an appeal to the notion of 
power reduced to an appeal to the notion of cause and effect. Having the power to produce 
something "is synonymous to causing" (Enquiry, VIII ii 74n). 
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cient skepticism does (contra Barnes) contain a clear analogue of central 
aspects of Hume's account of cause. (2) This aspect of ancient skepticism 
was readily available to Hume and his contemporaries through the 
seventeenth-century Stanley translation of Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhon- 
ism. (3) Other possible seventeenth-century sources for Hume's thoughts 
on cause (viz., Malebranche) also suggest a link to ancient thought. The 
gap between ancient and early modern philosophy may not be the chasm 
that the rhetoric of the early moderns would have us believe. 
Wilfrid Laurier University. 
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